e-ISSN: 3025-8189 ; p-ISSN: 3025-8197

LANCAH JURNAL INOVASI DAN TREN

doi.org/10.35870/ljit.v4i2.9129

Vol. 4, No. 2, 2026

PP. 2252-2261

Homepage http://www.journal.lembagakita.com/ljit

Political Recruitment, Organizational Commitment, and Indonesian Parliamentary Performance: A Mediation Study

Jazilul Fawaid[1], R. Madhakomala[2], Satri Dwi Kurnia Nasution[3]

Universitas Sunan Gresik, Gresik, Jawa Timur, Indonesia[1,3]

Universitas Negeri Jakarta, Jakarta Timur, Indonesia[2]

Corresponding Author's Email: jazilulfawaid@lecturer.usg.ac.id

ARTICLE INFO

Article History:

Submitted *10 30, 2026*
Accepted *11 09, 2026*
Published *11 30, 2026*

ABSTRACT

Political recruitment may shape parliamentary performance through both candidate selection and organizational commitment. This study examines the relationship between recruitment and self-reported performance among Indonesian House of Representatives members serving in 2014–2019, with commitment as a mediator. The dissertation-based survey involved 233 members from a population of 560, with data collected and processed during January–July 2018. Reported path estimates were retained from the original model, which also included competence. Recruitment was positively associated with performance (β = 0.535) and commitment (β = 0.638), while commitment was positively associated with performance (β = 0.161). The product of standardized paths yielded an indirect estimate of 0.103. A Sobel calculation using the displayed unstandardized coefficients and standard errors yielded z ≈ 2.394 and two-sided p = .017. These results are consistent with partial statistical mediation. However, inconsistencies in the source reporting and significant deviations from linearity require verification against the original data. The findings support attention to recruitment criteria and institutional responsibility while remaining observational, historically bounded, and based on self-reported performance.

Keywords: *Political Recruitment; Organizational Commitment; Parliamentary Performance; Legislative Performance; DPR RI; Candidate Selection*

How to Cite:

Fawaid, J., Madhakomala, M., & Kurnia Nasution, S. D. (2026). Political Recruitment, Organizational Commitment, and Indonesian Parliamentary Performance: A Mediation Study. LANCAH: Jurnal Inovasi Dan Tren, 4(2), 2252-2261. https://journal.lembagakita.com/ljit/article/view/9129

Copyright @ 2026. Published by Lembaga Komunitas Informasi Teknologi Aceh (KITA), Indonesia. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0). Based on a work at http://journal.lembagakita.com/ljit

Abstract & Indexing CC BY-NC 4.0 OPEN ACCESS

INTRODUCTION

The performance of Indonesia's House of Representatives (DPR RI) is shaped by legislative, budgetary, oversight, and constituency responsibilities, but these outcomes are not interchangeable with members' own assessments of workplace behavior. The official DPR RI 2014–2019 performance account records 189 bills in the legislative program and 90 bills enacted during the term, of which 36 were from the 2015–2019 legislative program and 54 were cumulative-open bills (DPR RI, 2019). These institutional totals provide context for performance concerns, not a dependent variable in the survey examined here. Research conducted in 2018 is therefore situated within a historically identifiable parliamentary term rather than generalized to the current DPR membership.

A political-institutional explanation begins with party gatekeeping. Candidate selection determines who can compete, the relative importance of party organizations and party elites, and the incentives attached to legislative careers. Rahat and Hazan (2001) distinguish selection arrangements in terms of candidacy, selectorates, decentralization, and voting or appointment procedures. In Indonesia, scholarship on party financing and clientelistic brokerage shows why recruitment cannot simply be equated with merit-based hiring (Mietzner, 2007; Aspinall, 2014). Evidence of centralized candidate selection in Golkar and PDIP subnational executive contests further illustrates an institutional mechanism, although it must not be treated as direct evidence about national legislative nominations (Budi, 2020). Accordingly, perceived recruitment quality may reflect transparent screening and role preparation, but may also coexist with patronage, personalism, and elite control.

An organizational-behavior explanation is needed alongside this institutional account. The source dissertation measures organizational commitment with loyalty, acceptance of organizational goals, adherence to values and rules, and responsibility. Meyer and Allen (1997) conceptualize commitment as an attachment to an identifiable organizational target; Meyer and Herscovitch (2001) likewise emphasize commitment as a force binding a person to a course of action relevant to a target. For legislators, the target may be the nominating party, parliamentary faction, or DPR institution. The available composite questionnaire does not sufficiently separate these targets; the present article therefore uses the narrower label 'reported organizational commitment' and does not equate party loyalty with service to constituents.

Integrating these literatures suggests a qualified pathway: parties set selection criteria and communicate expectations before parliamentary service; these experiences may relate to subsequent organizational attachment and to members' reported planning, teamwork, communication, and evaluation. A direct association between recruitment and performance can reflect selection or role preparation, while an indirect statistical association through commitment can reflect identification with organizational goals. Yet centralized selection can also strengthen dependence on party elites rather than public accountability. Thus, the association expected by organizational theory is politically contingent, and cross-sectional survey coefficients cannot determine whether the mechanism is meritocratic recruitment, party discipline, or personalized patronage (Rahat et al., 2008; Riketta, 2002).

The research gap is the limited integration of Indonesian party-candidate-selection scholarship with organizational commitment and self-reported parliamentary work performance in the same empirical specification. Existing Indonesian recruitment studies principally discuss nomination procedures or local elections (Fitriyah, 2020; Nendissa & Rahakbauw, 2020), whereas organizational studies often concern employees rather than elected legislators (Ramadhan et al., 2021; Riketta, 2002). This article does not claim to measure party discipline or legislative output directly. It examines whether the dissertation's historical

recruitment–commitment–performance path remains interpretable when political-institutional qualifications, the organizational target of commitment, and numerical inconsistencies are stated explicitly.

The study addresses four questions: (1) is perceived political recruitment associated with self-reported performance; (2) is recruitment associated with reported organizational commitment; (3) is commitment associated with performance after adjustment for recruitment and competence; and (4) does the original model support an indirect recruitment–performance association through commitment? The contribution is a bounded interpretation of 2018 survey evidence from 233 DPR members, not a claim that party reform has been experimentally shown to improve legislative outputs.

The integrated framework implies H1: recruitment has a positive conditional association with performance because selection criteria and role preparation may align capabilities with legislative tasks; H2: recruitment has a positive association with commitment insofar as selection communicates organizational expectations; H3: commitment is positively associated with performance because attachment and responsibility may accompany more consistent work behavior (Meyer & Allen, 1997; Riketta, 2002); and H4: recruitment has a positive indirect association with performance through commitment, conditional on the original model and its measurement limitations (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). The hypotheses concern associations, not proven causal effects.

METHODS OF RESEARCH

The original research adopted a quantitative survey design and path analysis. The study setting was the DPR office in Jakarta, and the dissertation places instrument testing, data collection, and processing within January–July 2018. The population consisted of 560 DPR RI members serving in the 2014–2019 term, and the analyzed sample comprised 233 members.

The research used the Taro Yamane formula to determine sample size and described a simple random sampling approach. The available reporting does not provide a fully auditable recruitment log or a denominator for all members invited to participate. Consequently, the sample count should not be interpreted as a response rate, and representativeness across political factions cannot be independently confirmed from the aggregate tables.

Data were collected using researcher-developed questionnaires. Response options were frequency categories ranging from never to always, with both positively and negatively worded statements. Performance was explicitly operationalized as members' self-assessment of their work, so the outcome is a reported behavioral score rather than an independently verified count of legislative products or constituency services.

Table 1. Measurement Structure in the Dissertation

Construct	Items	Operational dimensions
Political recruitment	25	Candidate provision; selection criteria; recruitment control
Organizational commitment	25	Loyalty; acceptance of goals; organizational values; rule compliance; responsibility
Performance	30	Planning; implementation; motivation; work relationships; communication; teamwork; supervision; evaluation
Competence	20	Knowledge; work skills; behavior in performing duties

Source: Adapted from Fawaid (2020)

A pilot involving 50 members outside the final sample is described in the dissertation. Item validity was assessed using Pearson item-total correlations, and internal consistency was assessed using Cronbach's alpha. The source reports all 30 performance items and all 25 recruitment items as valid and reports alpha of 0.945 for performance and 0.945 in the recruitment subsection; however, inconsistent variable labels in the reliability narrative warrant checking the original instrument outputs before submission.

The article retains the reported coefficients from the original four-variable model. The commitment equation included recruitment and competence, while the performance equation included recruitment, competence, and commitment (MacKinnon, 2012). Competence is therefore retained as a covariate in the numerical interpretation; removing it would change the esteemed and require re-estimation rather than merely omitting its name from the article.

For standardized scores, the focal relations are expressed as

$$M = aX + dC + eM \text{ and } Y = c'X + bM + gC + eY,$$

Here X denotes recruitment, M reported organizational commitment, C competence, and Y self-reported performance. The focal indirect estimate is a × b. Its approximate significance is assessed with the Sobel method using the original coefficients and standard errors; the calculation is a verification of published aggregate outputs, not a new respondent-level analysis (Preacher & Hayes, 2008).

Preacher and Hayes (2008) discuss asymptotic and resampling approaches to indirect-effect assessment. A bootstrap confidence interval would strengthen the present assessment, but no such interval is invented from the aggregate outputs. Ethics approval, participant consent procedures, funding declarations, and detailed data-access arrangements must be supplied by the author because the material used for this article does not establish those particulars.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Results

The descriptive output reports 233 valid observations and no missing scores for the four variables. Table 2 summarizes the three focal constructs. Because their item counts differ, raw totals should not be compared as if they represented an identical measurement scale.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Focal Constructs

Construct	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum
Recruitment	94.05	16.39	65	121
Commitment	96.76	15.77	62	122
Performance	109.20	17.09	81	144

Source: Adapted from Fawaid (2020)

The source reports positive bivariate correlations between recruitment and performance (r = 0.794), recruitment and commitment (r = 0.789), and commitment and performance (r = 0.695). These correlations describe overall associations before adjustment in the structural equations. They are distinct from the coefficients in Table 3, which come from equations that also include competence.

Table 3. Focal Regression Paths from the Original Model

Path	B	SE	β	t	p
Recruitment → performance	0.558	0.089	0.535	6.237	< .001
Recruitment → commitment	0.614	0.074	0.638	8.261	< .001
Commitment → performance	0.175	0.070	0.161	2.504	.013

Source: Adapted from Fawaid (2020)



Figure 1. Recruitment–commitment–performance framework (competence retained as a covariate).
Source: *Adapted from Fawaid (2020)*

Figure 1 depicts the relationships retained from the source dissertation, including competence as a covariate in both endogenous equations. Recruitment was associated with performance (β = 0.535, t = 6.237, p < .001) and commitment (β = 0.638, t = 8.261, p < .001); commitment was associated with performance (β = 0.161, t = 2.504, p = .013). The product of standardized paths is 0.103, whereas the unstandardized product is 0.10745. Using the displayed unstandardized coefficients and standard errors, a Sobel approximation gives z ≈ 2.394 and two-sided p ≈ .017. This supports an indirect statistical association under the specified model, but an unverified dissertation summary report 0.286 and cannot be reconciled without the original software output.

The positive direct path remains present alongside the positive indirect pathway. This pattern is consistent with partial statistical mediation, rather than complete mediation. It should not be interpreted as a demonstrated temporal mechanism because recruitment perceptions, commitment, and performance were examined in an observational survey without experimentally assigned recruitment conditions. The original analysis reported $R^2 = 0.649$ for the performance equation and $R^2 = 0.630$ for the commitment equation. These values concern the full equations including competence and cannot be attributed solely to the three focal constructs. They are reproduced as reported rather than independently verified measures of model fit.

Discussion

The findings suggest that the quality attributed to political recruitment may carry relevance beyond election nomination, extending to how representatives describe their work once elected. However, party recruitment is a political gatekeeping institution rather than a neutral human-resources procedure. Where selectorates are highly centralized, an observed recruitment–performance association could be consistent

with clear screening criteria, elite sponsorship, stronger party discipline, or some combination of these mechanisms. The survey does not measure which interpretation is correct (Rahat & Hazan, 2001; Aspinall, 2014; Budi, 2020). This political ambiguity is a substantive finding about the bounds of organizational explanations, not merely a statistical limitation.

The Indonesia-specific context sharpens this boundary. Clientelistic brokerage and uneven party institutionalization can affect candidate dependence on political intermediaries (Aspinall, 2014; Mietzner, 2007). Budi (2020) documents centralization in the selection of subnational executive candidates in two large parties. These studies offer plausible competing explanations for the national-legislature relationship investigated here, but they do not establish how any sampled DPR member was nominated. A policy implication is to assess recruitment transparency, the composition of selectorates, publicly stated competency criteria, and auditable screening practices rather than assuming that strong recruitment coefficients demonstrate meritocracy.

The commitment pathway is also politically conditional. Loyalty to a party or faction may improve coordination and task discipline but may conflict with independent oversight or responsiveness to constituents. The dissertation measures commitment as a composite without separating commitment to the party, parliamentary faction, DPR institution, or electorate. Hence the positive commitment coefficient is best read as an association between reported organizational attachment and work behavior; it is not evidence that stronger party loyalty improves democratic accountability (Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001; Riketta, 2002). Subsequent research should use multi-target commitment measures to test these competing mechanisms.

The contrast between the two literatures therefore refines, rather than replaces, the proposed pathway. Organizational theory predicts that coherent expectations and attachment can accompany sustained role performance, whereas candidate-selection research asks whose expectations and interests are served. The statistical results support the existence of conditional associations in the 2018 model, but only political-institutional evidence can clarify whether the associated behaviors align with parties, the legislature, or citizens (Rahat et al., 2008; Meyer & Allen, 1997).

The study outcome is a self-assessed behavioral score encompassing planning, implementation, communication, cooperation, supervision, and evaluation, not an independently observed measure of enacted laws, oversight quality, budget scrutiny, or constituency service. Official legislative output for the 2014–2019 term contextualizes public interest in parliamentary performance but cannot validate or explain individual questionnaire scores (DPR RI, 2019). Consequently, even a strong reported recruitment coefficient cannot establish improvements in lawmaking productivity, public trust, or integrity.

The continued direct recruitment–performance association alongside the positive indirect pathway is consistent with partial statistical mediation. Commitment does not exhaust the conditional relationship, leaving open the roles of political experience, professional competence, faction organization, patronage relations, and institutional resources. These are competing theoretical possibilities that were not directly tested as mediators in this focused analysis.

The source contains incompatible representations of the recruitment indirect effect. Its narrative uses the unstandardized product 0.10745 and reports z about 2.50, while a summary table lists an indirect coefficient of 0.286. This article explicitly distinguishes the standardized product 0.103 from the unstandardized product 0.10745 and uses the displayed coefficient-table standard errors to reconstruct $z \approx 2.394$; the value 0.286 is not used because it is not reproduced by the focal path product.

There is also a small discrepancy in the recruitment–commitment test statistic: the coefficient table reports t = 8.261, whereas the narrative reports 8.281. The coefficient table is used consistently in this article, and no exact correction to the underlying output is claimed. Original software output should resolve the discrepancy before submission, including whether differences reflect rounding or transcription.

Normality checks in the dissertation report Lilliefors statistics below the stated critical value for the focal regression residuals. However, the displayed ANOVA tables report significant deviations from linearity for performance on recruitment, performance on commitment, and commitment on recruitment. This conflicts with the narrative claim that linearity requirements were satisfied and means that the linear path interpretation requires renewed diagnostic assessment.

Other limitations concern self-report bias, possible common-source covariance, and omitted determinants of parliamentary behavior. Recruitment and competence were strongly correlated in the dissertation (r = 0.855), making multicollinearity diagnostics relevant to coefficient stability. Furthermore, members belong to shared party and institutional structures, while the reported analysis does not establish cluster-adjusted inference; historical findings from 2018 also cannot be assumed to describe later parliamentary terms.

A stronger follow-up should verify the original dataset, assess functional form and residual behavior, and estimate bootstrap intervals for the indirect association. It should distinguish commitment targets and complement self-assessment with independently recorded indicators of work. Longitudinal measurement would also help evaluate whether changes in commitment precede changes in performance, rather than assuming that temporal sequence from the path diagram.

CONCLUSION

The four research questions yield four bounded answers. First, recruitment is positively associated with self-reported DPR member performance in the original competence-adjusted model. Second, recruitment is positively associated with reported organizational commitment. Third, commitment retains a positive conditional association with performance. Fourth, the positive indirect pathway is consistent with partial statistical mediation, although the original coefficients and model diagnostics require verification. The theoretical implication is that candidate-selection institutions and organizational attachment should be analyzed together: party gatekeeping may communicate work expectations, but commitment to party, faction, DPR, and constituents are not interchangeable. For Indonesian parties, the practical priority is transparent selection criteria and accountable role development, paired with objective legislative-performance indicators. Because the source is a historical observational survey and displays inconsistent indirect-effect reporting and significant deviations from linearity, none of these associations demonstrates that a particular recruitment reform causally improves parliamentary performance.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Political parties could strengthen documented candidate-screening criteria, selectorate transparency, conflict-of-interest safeguards, and post-election orientation while assessing results through independently verifiable legislative, oversight, budget, and constituency indicators. Further research should distinguish party, faction, DPR, and public-service commitment; test faction or party clustering; and examine whether

selection centralization or patronage moderates the observed associations. These are recommendations for evaluation, not effects established by the survey.

Before journal submission, the author should reconcile the original regression and mediation outputs and confirm the measurement documentation. The submission should also include verified authorship and affiliation details, a corresponding email, ethics and consent information, and funding and conflict-of-interest declarations. These details should be provided from actual records rather than inferred from the dissertation context.

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

Jazilul Fawaid contributed to the study conception, development of the research design, original data collection, and preparation of the initial research manuscript. R. Madhakomala contributed to research supervision, methodological review, interpretation of the findings, and critical revision of the manuscript. Satri Dwi Kurnia Nasution contributed to adaptation of the research into a journal article, organization of the analysis and discussion, and manuscript review and editing. All authors must review and approve the final submitted version and agree to be accountable for their respective contributions.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

All authors have read, reviewed, and approved the final version of this manuscript, and mutually agree to its submission and publication. Furthermore, the authors declare that there are no known competing financial interests, personal relationships, or professional affiliations that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI) USE STATEMENT

Artificial intelligence (AI) assistance was used in revising the manuscript's language, organizing and adapting its sections to the LANCAH journal template, and improving editorial clarity. The numerical results presented were taken from the source manuscript; the original respondent-level dataset was not independently accessed or reanalyzed as part of this editorial revision. The authors are responsible for verifying all statements, analyses, references, and disclosures and for approving the final manuscript.

REFERENCES

Ariyati, Y., & Amelia, P. (2018). Pengaruh proses rekrutmen, seleksi dan motivasi kerja terhadap komitmen organisasi di PT. Advantage SCM Batam. *Jurnal Bening*, *5*(2), 120. https://doi.org/10.33373/bening.v5i2.1347

Aspinall, E. (2014). When brokers betray: Clientelism, social networks, and electoral politics in Indonesia. *Critical Asian Studies*, *46*(4), 545–570. https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2014.960706

Budi, A. (2020). Less democracy, more centralism: The selection of candidates by Golkar and PDIP in Indonesian subnational executive elections, 2005–2020. *Asian Journal of Political Science*, *28*(3), 236–255. https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2020.1774909

Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia. (2019). *Capaian DPR RI periode 2014–2019* (Laporan kinerja, Bab IV). https://berkas.dpr.go.id/akd/dokumen/-35-d8b497baee55eac592edd416a2ad27ad.pdf

Djohan, D. P., & Surya, I. B. K. (2023). Pengaruh kompetensi, komitmen organisasional dan pengembangan karir terhadap kinerja karyawan. *E-Jurnal Manajemen Universitas Udayana*, *12*(2), 159. https://doi.org/10.24843/EJMUNUD.2023.v12.i02.p03

Etikawati, E., & Udjang, R. (2016). Strategi rekrutmen dan seleksi terhadap kinerja karyawan. *Jurnal Perilaku dan Strategi Bisnis*, *4*(1). https://doi.org/10.26486/jpsb.v4i1.443

Fitriyah, F. (2020). Partai politik, rekrutmen politik dan pembentukan dinasti politik pada Pemilihan Kepala Daerah (Pilkada). *Politika: Jurnal Ilmu Politik*, *11*(1), 1–17. https://doi.org/10.14710/politika.11.1.2020.1-17

Padmadani, I. A., & Achmad, N. (2024). Apakah budaya organisasi memediasi pengaruh rekrutmen karyawan dan komitmen organisasi terhadap kinerja karyawan pada PT TMI di Cikarang Pusat. *Jurnal Ekuilnomi*, *6*(3), 559–570. https://doi.org/10.36985/768taf97

MacKinnon, D. P. (2012). *Introduction to statistical mediation analysis* (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203809556

Meyer, J. P., & Herscovitch, L. (2001). Commitment in the workplace: Toward a general model. *Human Resource Management Review*, *11*(3), 299–326. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1053-4822(00)00053-X

Meyer, J. P., & Allen, N. J. (1997). *Commitment in the workplace: Theory, research, and application*. SAGE Publications. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781452231556

Mietzner, M. (2007). Party financing in post-Soeharto Indonesia: Between state subsidies and political corruption. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, *29*(2), 238–263. https://doi.org/10.1355/CS29-2B

Nendissa, R. H., & Rahakbauw, C. P. I. (2020). Transparansi partai politik dalam rekrutmen calon legislatif. *SASI*, *26*(1), 119–127. https://doi.org/10.47268/sasi.v26i1.261

Para'pak, M. (2015). Pengaruh rekrutmen dan komitmen organisasi terhadap kinerja kepala sekolah dasar Kabupaten Manokwari. *Jurnal Manajemen Pendidikan*, *6*(2), 1178–1186. https://doi.org/10.21009/jmp.v6i2.1867

Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2008). Asymptotic and resampling strategies for assessing and comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. *Behavior Research Methods*, *40*(3), 879–891. https://doi.org/10.3758/BRM.40.3.879

Rahat, G., & Hazan, R. Y. (2001). Candidate selection methods: An analytical framework. *Party Politics*, *7*(3), 297–322. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068801007003003

Rahat, G., Hazan, R. Y., & Katz, R. S. (2008). Democracy and political parties: On the uneasy relationships between participation, competition and representation. *Party Politics*, *14*(6), 663–683. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068808093405

Ramadhan, W. A., Setyowati, T., Hia, Y. F., & Reskiputri, T. D. (2021). Rekrutmen, karakteristik individual, dan komitmen organisasional terhadap kinerja karyawan. *Jurnal Penelitian dan Pengembangan Sains dan Humaniora*, *5*(2), 272–279.

Riketta, M. (2002). Attitudinal organizational commitment and job performance: A meta-analysis. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, *23*(3), 257–266. https://doi.org/10.1002/job.141

Riyadh U.B., A., & Sukmana, H. (2015). Model rekrutmen politik calon anggota legislatif oleh partai politik di Kabupaten Sidoarjo. *JKMP (Jurnal Kebijakan dan Manajemen Publik)*, *3*(2), 179–198. https://doi.org/10.21070/jkmp.v3i2.191

Warsito, W., & Prasetyo, Y. (2016). Pola rekrutmen calon legislatif partai politik. *Jurnal Ilmu Sosial*, *5*(2), 97–111. https://doi.org/10.14710/jis.5.2.2006.97-111