E-ISSN: 2774-5694 P-ISSN: 2776-7388 OPEN ACCESS

International Journal of Management Science and Information Technology
IJMSIT

Volume 6 (2), July-December 2026, 2371-2384
DOI: https://doi.org/10.35870/ijmsit.v6i2.8595

Managing the Stock, Not the Capability: Means Ends Decoupling in A Public Organization After a Legislated Revenue Shock

Zulkifli [1], Sukrisno [2], Marsha Ayunita Irawati [3], Silvia Hendrayanti [4*]
[1,3,4*] Management Study Program, Faculty of Economics, Universitas Sains Teknologi Ekonomi Digital Indonesia, Semarang City, Central Java Province, Indonesia
[2] Doctoral Program in Economics, Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Diponegoro, Semarang City, Central Java Province, Indonesia

Email: zul.pining@gmail.com [1], sukrisno@students.undip.ac.id [2], marsha.ayunita@gmail.com [3], silviahendrayanti45@gmail.com [4*]

Article history:
Received August 29, 2026
Revised September 4, 2026
Accepted September 6, 2026

Abstract

When an organization cannot contest a resource loss, what determines whether its response builds capability or merely improves the reported indicator? This study examines Central Java Province, Indonesia, whose two largest tax instruments were statutorily reassigned to lower tier jurisdictions in January 2025, cutting provincial tax revenue by 19.51% in a single year. The province responded with a tax amnesty and reported a 15.96% reduction in its receivables stock. Reconciling the disclosed movements in the allowance for doubtful receivables implies write-offs of approximately IDR 656.91 billion against a reported stock reduction of IDR 480.34 billion, which would mean that receivables excluding derecognition grew by roughly IDR 176.57 billion. The reconciliation is a derived estimate rather than a reported figure, and the paper states the conditions under which it would not hold. The ratio that measures collection capability, which is not sensitive to those conditions, deteriorated from 20.39% to 21.29% of annual tax revenue. A within case comparison sharpens the interpretation: in the same organization and the same year, user charges reached 123.05% of target while taxes reached 91.81%, indicating that the shortfall was instrument-specific rather than organization wide. The study theorizes this as means ends decoupling under an uncontestable shock and proposes, for subsequent testing, three conditions that should make an indicator directed response more likely than a capability-directed one.

Keywords:
Means ends decoupling; Organizational capability; Symbolic response; Public organizations; Performance indicators; Institutional shock.

1. INTRODUCTION

Organizations under pressure to improve a visible indicator can either build the capability the indicator represents or act directly on the indicator itself. The second route is faster, cheaper, and observationally similar to the first, so an organization that improves its numbers without improving capability can consume the appearance of progress while the underlying problem remains.

Institutional theory describes this gap through decoupling: Meyer and Rowan (1977) identified the separation of formal structure from operational activity, and Bromley and Powell (2012) refined this into means–ends decoupling, in which a policy is genuinely implemented but stays disconnected from the outcome it was meant to produce. Most of this literature examines organizations adopting practices to gain legitimacy. Far less is known about the reverse trigger: an organization that suffers a sudden, uncontestable loss of resources and must be seen to respond. Under such pressure, an organization subordinate to the authority that caused the loss cannot defy, negotiate, or avoid it (Oliver, 1991); acquiescence combined with internal adjustment is the only available strategy, and the analytical question becomes what quality of adjustment follows.

Whether that adjustment builds capability or merely acts on an indicator depends on how the indicator itself behaves. Public measures are reactive: monitoring an indicator redirects organizational effort toward it, particularly where the measure is salient and can be moved administratively rather than only through operational improvement (Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Pierre & de Fine Licht, 2021). Capability, by contrast, is a set of identifiable, repeatable routines through which an organization alters its resource base (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; Teece, 2007; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000); because such routines are slow to build and slow to decay, a genuine capability improvement shows up as a sustained change in a ratio, whereas an administrative action on a stock shows up as a single-period step. This distinction yields the test applied in this paper: a receivables stock can fall through collection, which reflects capability, or through derecognition, which does not, and the two are separable in the disclosed flows even though they are indistinguishable in the stock figure alone.

This study examines such a case in unusually clean form. In January 2025 Indonesia implemented a fiscal relations law (Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 1 Tahun 2022) that transferred 66% of two vehicle-related tax instruments from provincial governments to their constituent regencies and cities. For Central Java Province, whose own-source revenue was concentrated in exactly those instruments, provincial tax revenue fell 19.51% in twelve months, from IDR 14.21 trillion to IDR 11.44 trillion, while the regional economy grew by approximately 5.2%. The loss was legislated, immediate, and beyond the organization's power to negotiate.

The province's most visible remaining performance problem was its receivables stock: IDR 2.90 trillion of assessed but uncollected vehicle tax at the end of 2024, equal to a fifth of annual tax revenue. It responded with a tax amnesty operated between April and June 2025 and reported a reduction of 15.96% by year end. On the face of the accounts, an organization facing a resource shock had improved its collection position. It had not: reconciling the movement in the allowance for doubtful receivables against the reported expense implies write-offs of IDR 656.91 billion during 2025, more than the IDR 480.34 billion by which the gross stock fell, so that receivables excluding derecognition grew by roughly IDR 176.57 billion. The entire reported improvement, and more, was produced by removing debt from the balance sheet rather than by collecting it, and the ratio that actually measures collection capability moved from 20.39% to 21.29% of annual tax revenue.

This study asks what determines whether an organization facing an uncontestable resource shock responds by building capability or by acting on the indicator. It answers by tracing the flows behind a reported improvement in a single organization, and by exploiting a within-case comparison that holds the organization, the year and the economy constant: user charges, administered by the same government under the same conditions, reached 123.05% of target while taxes reached 91.81%. Three propositions follow, examined in Section 3: that a stock improvement produced by derecognition rather than collection will be visible in the stock but absent from the flows; that where the base generating a stock is contracting, the ratio will deteriorate even as the stock improves; and that if the shortfall reflects capability rather than circumstance, it will vary across instruments within the same organization and period.

1.1. Means Ends Decoupling

Decoupling in its original formulation described a gap between formal structure and actual practice: organizations adopt structures that signal conformity while insulating their technical core from them (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Bromley and Powell (2012) argue that this policy practice gap has become less common as monitoring has intensified, and that a second form has become dominant. In means ends decoupling, policies are genuinely implemented and activity genuinely occurs, but the activity is disconnected from the outcome it was intended to produce. The organization is busy rather than idle, and the gap is between effort and effect rather than between claim and effort.

This distinction matters for the present case. The province did not fail to act. It designed and executed an amnesty, deployed field recovery teams, and processed a substantial volume of transactions. Activity was real. What was absent was any improvement in the capability the activity was ostensibly directed at, and the accounts allow that absence to be measured rather than inferred.

Two further properties of means–ends decoupling are relevant. It is typically not deceptive in intent; participants often believe the activity is effective, because the indicator they monitor does improve (Bromley & Powell, 2012). And it is self-reinforcing, because the improved indicator reduces the pressure that might otherwise have forced a substantive response.

Recent work has begun to specify the mechanisms involved. Kaufmann, Krlev and Brown (2025), studying impact investing, identify how means ends decoupling is produced and sustained in fields where outcomes are difficult to observe, and show that the gap between compliance and achievement is reproduced by ordinary organizational routines rather than by exceptional decisions. Their account applies directly here: the province’s amnesty, its field recovery teams and its reporting cycle are all routine instruments, and the decoupling arises from how they interact rather than from any departure from normal practice.

Athanasopoulou, Marti, Risi and Schlindwein (2025) examine the opposite question what restrains means–ends decoupling and find that experimentation and context-specific knowledge production, supported by normative rather than purely procedural control, are what close the gap between compliance and achievement. Read against the present case their finding identifies what is absent: the province’s response involved no experimentation with collection method and generated no new knowledge about which liabilities are recoverable, which is the condition under which they expect decoupling to persist.

Systematic review work locates means ends decoupling in field opacity: where causal relations between practice and outcome are hard to observe, compliance and achievement become separable and remedying one may worsen the other (Jabbouri, Schneckenberg, & Truong, 2022). This organization operates in such a field, since the relation between collection effort and realized revenue is mediated by a register it does not control. Bertello, De Bernardi, Ferraris and Bresciani (2022) show that policy practice and means ends decoupling arise from distinct organizational mechanisms, the latter driven by technical complexity and the diffusion of best practice rather than by any deliberate intent to misrepresent. The evidence here cannot establish which mechanism was operating, so Section 6.1 frames its conditions in terms of what makes the indicator-directed route attractive rather than in terms of intent.

The closest empirical precedent is Vakulenko, Bourmistrov and Grossi's (2020) study of healthcare-financing reform in Ukraine, which traces how central reform intentions and local implementation persistently diverge in a public sector setting. Two features differ here. Their case examines decoupling between a reform's stated ideas and local practice, whereas this organization decouples a reported outcome from the activity meant to generate it; and their trigger is a prolonged, multi-decade reform effort, whereas here it is an abrupt involuntary loss of resources. The present case therefore extends the account to a different trigger and to decoupling located in the measurement system rather than in policy implementation.

1.2. Uncontestable Shocks and the Truncation of Strategic Response

Oliver (1991) specifies five strategic responses to institutional pressure: acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance and manipulation. The selection among them depends on the source of the pressure and the organization's dependence on that source. A legislated resource reassignment truncates this repertoire from the coercive end. An organization subordinate to the legislating authority cannot defy or manipulate; avoidance is foreclosed because the reassignment operates on the organization's accounts directly rather than on its conduct; and compromise is unavailable because there is no negotiation.

The situation is distinguishable from institutional complexity in the sense of Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta and Lounsbury (2011), where organizations confront incompatible prescriptions from multiple logics and must manage the incompatibility. Here there is no incompatibility to manage: a single authority issued a single unambiguous instruction, and the organization complied. What it faces is not competing demands but a foreclosed response set, which is a different and less studied condition. The distinction matters because the repertoire developed for institutional complexity compartmentalizing, sequencing, hybridizing presupposes plural demands and is unavailable when the pressure is singular and coercive.

Acquiescence combined with internal adjustment is therefore the only available strategy. The analytical question shifts from which response is selected to what quality of adjustment follows. This is where decoupling becomes likely. When an organization must be seen to respond but cannot act on the cause of its difficulty, the available targets are its own internal indicators, and the pressure to demonstrate competence attaches to whichever of those is most visible.

Two 2026 studies bear on this configuration. Han, Hwang, Kim and Robertson (2026) show that accountability systems affect public employees differently according to role clarity and job autonomy, so a shared claim without defined roles imposes cost without producing effort. Siciliano, Zehra, Gutiérrez-Meave, Deslatte and Krause (2026) find that a government's internal organization shapes its external collaborative networks, implying that structural arrangement, not only inter-agency agreement, conditions what collaboration achieves.

Eckersley, Lakoma, Murphy, Caygill and Pell (2025) extend resource dependency reasoning into governance networks and show that power relationships within a network determine how accountability is distributed across it, and thereby which governance paradigm prevails in practice. Their argument bears directly on what follows, because the surcharge did not merely move revenue; it created a network of thirty-six governments holding a shared claim with an unequal distribution of control over the process that realizes it. On their analysis accountability in such a configuration settles according to power rather than formal assignment, which anticipates the ownership vacuum documented in Section 3.5.

1.3. Capability versus Indicator

Elston and Zhang (2025) supply the empirical complement, showing that bureaucratic capacity converts into action only where slack resources and political control permit. Capacity, on their evidence, is necessary but not sufficient which is why Section 3.7 treats executive sponsorship as a condition rather than a recommendation. Applying the construct to a public organization requires one adaptation. Loureiro, Ferreira and Simões (2021), reviewing this literature, argue that dynamic capabilities remain analytically useful in public settings but that their microfoundations differ, because such organizations face environmental turbulence they cannot exit and must therefore reconfigure within a fixed mandate rather than across a portfolio of markets. Reconfiguration accordingly operates on how a mandate is executed, and its observable trace is a change in operating ratios rather than a change in the composition of activities.

Capability in the dynamic capabilities tradition is a set of routines through which an organization alters its resource base (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; Teece, 2007). Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) insist that such capabilities are identifiable routines rather than tautological competences. This makes them empirically tractable: a capability exists to the extent that a specific, repeatable process exists. Routines so defined are slow to build and slow to decay, which gives them a characteristic signature: a genuine capability improvement shows up as a sustained change in a ratio, whereas an action on a stock shows up as a single-period step. This yields the test applied in Section 3. A stock can be reduced by collection, which reflects capability, or by derecognition, which does not. The two are indistinguishable in the stock figure but separable in the flows, because derecognition passes through the allowance account while collection passes through cash. Public financial reporting standards require both to be disclosed, which makes the distinction observable in any organization publishing audited statements.

A definitional caution is required. This study does not measure capability directly; it uses the receivables ratio as a proxy. The reasoning would be circular if the ratio were also the definition, and it is not: capability is defined as the existence of specific collection routines, of which the ratio is one observable consequence. An independent measure the proportion of assessed liability recovered within a defined period would be superior but is not publicly disclosed. The framework therefore predicts that where a shock is uncontestable, an indicator is visible, and a derecognition instrument is available, the organization will act on the stock rather than on the ratio, and that the ratio will consequently deteriorate even as the stock improves.

1.4. Performance Measurement and the Reactivity of Indicators

A parallel literature on performance measurement supplies the mechanism by which indicator-directed responses arise, and it is worth joining to the decoupling account because the two have developed largely separately. Espeland and Sauder (2007) show that public measures are reactive: measuring changes what is measured, because organizations reallocate effort toward the dimensions captured. Reactivity is a predictable consequence of visibility rather than deviance. Pierre and de Fine Licht (2021) document related behaviours in contemporary public organizations, distinguishing misrepresentation from the commoner pattern in which organizations hit the target and miss the point. Their central insight is that gaming concentrates wherever a measure is both salient and manipulable, which specifies the conditions under which an organization prefers the indicator to the capability.

Two implications follow for the present study. First, an indicator that can be moved by an administrative decision is structurally different from one that can only be moved by operational improvement, and the distinction is knowable in advance rather than only in retrospect. A receivables stock belongs to the first category because a write-off changes it; a ratio of receivables to revenue belongs largely to the second, because derecognition reduces numerator and denominator asymmetrically only when the base is stable. Second, reactivity predicts that the organization will attend to the measure that is published, which locates the analytical question in the reporting architecture rather than in managerial character.

Meng and Li (2025), synthesising 461 effect sizes from 75 studies, find that performance information does shift stakeholder attitudes and behaviour, and that the effect is strongest when the information is conveyed by a third party rather than by the reporting organization itself. That asymmetry matters here: an organization reporting its own improvement operates in the weaker of the two channels, which raises rather than lowers the incentive to make the reported figure unambiguous and a stock reduction is unambiguous in a way a ratio is not. Recent evidence qualifies how far these effects reach. Zhang, Li and Yang (2022), in a meta-analysis of the government performance trust link, find the association weaker and more context-dependent than the performance management literature assumes, implying that the reputational returns to an improved indicator are neither automatic nor uniform. Cantarelli, Belle and Hall (2023), synthesising research on information use in public decision making, reach a complementary conclusion: performance information is used selectively and instrumentally rather than comprehensively, so the indicator an organization acts upon is a choice rather than a given.

Two further studies sharpen the prediction. Taylor, McDonnell and Duong (2022), reviewing the causes and consequences of bureaucratic gaming, find that the behaviour is a predictable response to how performance systems are designed rather than a symptom of any particular administrative culture. Aboubichr and Conway (2023), studying performance management in British universities, separate milder forms of effort substitution from more serious misrepresentation of results, showing the two do not always co-occur; their finding of less dysfunction than theory anticipates is a useful corrective, since it implies that indicator-directed responses are not inevitable and that identifying the conditions that produce them is an empirical question. The present case falls into their more serious category, since a write off improves the measured stock without altering collection. Joining this literature to means ends decoupling clarifies what each contributes: the performance measurement tradition explains why a particular indicator attracts effort, while the institutional tradition explains why the resulting activity remains disconnected from outcomes and why that disconnection is stable rather than transitional. The case examined here requires both.

1.5. Synthesis: An Integrative Framework

The three literatures address different parts of one process and have developed largely in isolation. Institutional theory explains why activity becomes disconnected from outcome; capability theory why the disconnection persists; the measurement literature why a particular indicator attracts the effort. Table 1 states the constructs each contributes and the relationships among them. Six constructs carry the argument; one, assignability, is developed here because no existing construct captures the property that makes this case distinctive.

Table 1. Constructs, Definitions, and Empirical Indicators

Construct	Definition Adopted	Principal Source	Indicator in This Study
Legislated resource shock	An involuntary reduction in an organization's claim on a resource, effected by statute rather than by competitive or environmental change	Oliver (1991); Greenwood et al. (2011)	Statutory reassignment of 66% of two tax instruments, January 2025
Assignability	The vulnerability of an organization's claim on a resource to unilateral reallocation by a higher authority, independent of concentration	Developed here, from Iacuzzi et al. (2025) and Weingast (2009)	Share of tax revenue drawn from reassignable instruments (79.2%)
Collection capability	The set of organizational routines that convert assessed liability into realized cash	Teece et al. (1997); Eisenhardt & Martin (2000); Loureiro et al. (2021)	Receivables as a share of annual tax revenue
Indicator reactivity	The tendency of an organization to redirect effort toward whatever is publicly measured	Espeland & Sauder (2007); Pierre & de Fine Licht (2021)	Selection of the receivables stock as the object of intervention
Derecognition instrument	An administrative action that reduces a reported stock without altering the underlying state	Developed here	Amnesty; implied write-offs of IDR 656.91 billion
Means–ends decoupling	Genuine implementation of a policy that remains disconnected from the outcome it was adopted to produce	Jabbouri et al. (2022); Bromley & Powell (2012)	Stock improves 15.96% while the ratio deteriorates from 20.39% to 21.29%

Note. Sources are the works from which each definition is adopted, not an exhaustive list of relevant literature.
Source: author's synthesis.

The relationships among these constructs form a conditional model with four terms. A legislated resource shock is the antecedent: it reduces the organization's resource claim without altering its environment, and its severity is governed by assignability rather than by the size of the loss, since an organization holding low-assignability resources of equal value would not have experienced it. The shock generates pressure to demonstrate competence, and indicator reactivity determines where that pressure lands on whichever measure is visible and attributable to the organization rather than to the authority that imposed the loss.

Two moderators then govern which response follows. The availability of a derecognition instrument determines whether the indicator can be improved without improving the state it represents; where no such instrument exists, the organization has no alternative to substantive work. And the lead-time asymmetry between symbolic and substantive remedies determines whether the substantive route is feasible within the reporting cycle in which competence must be demonstrated. Where both moderators are permissive, the predicted outcome is means–ends decoupling: activity occurs, the stock improves, and collection capability does not. The model yields a diagnostic signature: a capability-directed response improves both stock and ratio, since collection reduces the numerator while the denominator is unaffected; an indicator-directed response improves the stock while leaving the ratio unchanged or worse, since derecognition removes items without generating cash. Where the base is simultaneously contracting, the divergence widens, so shock and response interact rather than operating independently.

1.6. Research Question and Propositions

Combining these strands yields the question this study addresses: when an organization suffers a resource loss it cannot contest, what determines whether its response builds the capability that its performance indicators represent, or acts on those indicators directly? Three propositions follow from the framework and are examined in Section 3.

The first concerns observability: if a reported improvement in a problem stock is produced by derecognition rather than by collection, the improvement will be visible in the stock but absent from the flows, and the two will be separable using disclosures the organization already publishes. The second concerns direction: if an organization acts on a stock while the base generating that stock is contracting, the ratio of stock to base will deteriorate even as the stock improves. The third concerns attribution: if the shortfall reflects capability rather than circumstance, it will vary across instruments within the same organization and the same period, since circumstance is common to both while the administrative task is not; this proposition supplies the case with an internal control and is the reason the study examines two revenue instruments rather than one. The three propositions are complementary rather than sequential: the first establishes that the mechanism is present, the second that it matters, and the third that it is organizational rather than environmental in origin.

Three contributions follow. First, the study extends means–ends decoupling from its usual setting of voluntary practice adoption to involuntary resource loss, and proposes three conditions indicator visibility and attributability, the availability of a derecognition instrument, and the lead-time asymmetry between symbolic and substantive remedies that make an indicator directed response more likely than a capability directed one. Second, it demonstrates a diagnostic that other researchers can apply: an allowance roll forward reconciliation that separates collection from derecognition in any organization reporting a receivables improvement, using only published financial statements. Third, it shows that within case variation across revenue instruments provides a control that single case designs are usually assumed to lack.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the research setting and method. Section 3 presents the shock, the reported improvement, its decomposition into collection and derecognition, the divergence between the stock and the ratio, the within-case comparison, and the theoretical and practical implications that follow. Section 4 concludes.

2. RESEARCH METHOD

2.1. The Research Setting

Indonesia's Law No. 1 of 2022 (Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 1 Tahun 2022) replaced revenue sharing between provincial and district governments with an opsen, a statutory surcharge levied by regencies and cities on the principal provincial tax. From 5 January 2025 districts collect 66% of motor vehicle tax and transfer duty liabilities, credited on the day of payment, while the province retains a reduced principal levy. What distinguishes the Indonesian version from surcharges generally recommended as a route to revenue autonomy for lower tiers (Iacuzzi, Padovani, & Canestrini, 2025) is that it was carved out of an existing instrument rather than layered on top, making it redistributive rather than revenue raising.

Central Java Province administers 35 regencies and cities and a regional economy with gross regional domestic product of IDR 1,817 trillion in 2024. Vehicle-related levies produced 79.2% of provincial tax revenue and 63.8% of all own source revenue in 2024, so the reform removed the greater part of the organization's dominant resource in a single step. Critically, the environment did not deteriorate: growth reached 4.95% in 2024 and accelerated through 2025 (4.96%, 5.28% and 5.37% across the first three quarters, the last exceeding the national rate of 5.04%), while investment realization reached IDR 66.13 trillion in the first three quarters and the poverty rate fell from 9.58% to 9.48%. The resource loss therefore occurred against an expanding base, which identifies it as institutional rather than cyclical.

Vehicle taxation in Indonesia is anchored to periodic re-registration rather than continuous ownership records: a vehicle that lapses from the re-registration cycle effectively exits the enforceable base while remaining in use, so unpaid liability accumulates as a receivable rather than triggering enforcement. At the end of 2024 the province carried IDR 2.90 trillion of tax receivables, of which motor vehicle tax accounted for 99.99% the organization's most conspicuous performance problem, and the one most clearly attributable to its own administration. The established remedy was an amnesty, operated between 8 April and 30 June 2025, waiving penalties and, in specified circumstances, principal arrears together with associated compulsory insurance surcharges.

This administrative constraint is consistent with the applied literature on tax administration, which finds that the benefits of digital systems depend less on technological sophistication than on whether the underlying taxpayer register is complete and reconciled (Bassey, Mulligan, & Ojo, 2022; Bellon, Dabla Norris, Khalid, & Lima, 2022), and that low enforcement capacity rather than statutory rates is typically what constrains revenue in developing-country settings (Bergeron, Tourek, & Weigel, 2024; Okunogbe & Santoro, 2023). Indonesian vehicle taxation inverts the usual remedy: the record establishing liability is held jointly by three agencies the province, the police registry, and the insurer and reconciled by none, so a lapsed registration extinguishes the informational trail rather than triggering enforcement.

2.2. Design and Data

The study uses a single revelatory case design (Yin, 2018; Siggelkow, 2007). The case earns its place by exhibiting a mechanism with no counterpart in the existing literature: a reported improvement in a problem stock that the same accounts show was not an improvement in capability, in a setting where the underlying flows are fully disclosed.

The evidence is the audited accountability record of the province for fiscal years 2024 and 2025 the budget realization statement, the balance sheet, the operational statement and the notes, together with the enacting regulation on accountability for budget implementation (Peraturan Daerah Provinsi Jawa Tengah Nomor 6

Tahun 2025). Instrument-level collection data were drawn from the provincial revenue agency's e-Samsat portal, since the accounts report local tax as a single line; macroeconomic indicators from Statistics Indonesia's Central Java office; and institutional detail from the 2025 policy study on surcharge optimization commissioned by the provincial legislature.

Analysis followed the documentary procedure specified by Bowen (2009): skimming to establish the structure of each statement, close reading of the receivables and allowance disclosures, arithmetic reconstruction of the flows, and interpretive comparison across instruments. Figures were cross checked across the balance sheet, the operational statement and the budget realization statement, which report overlapping quantities on different bases.

The analytical core is an allowance roll forward reconciliation: closing allowance equals opening allowance plus the period's bad-debt expense less amounts written off, so write-offs are recoverable as a residual from three disclosed figures. Setting the implied write off against the change in gross receivables separates the portion of the reported reduction attributable to derecognition from the portion attributable to collection. The reconciliation assumes that allowance movements comprise only expense and write offs, with no reversals or reclassifications; Section 3.3 reports the sensitivity of the conclusion to that assumption and names the disclosed item that could overturn it.

Working from published rather than internal statements carries a deliberate advantage: audited accountability statements are prepared to a defined standard, subject to external examination, and legally binding on the organization that issues them, so a finding derived from them is one the organization cannot disown, and the diagnostic can be applied by any external party without privileged access. The province's accounts carry an unqualified opinion from the national audit board (Ferry, Radcliffe, & Steccolini, 2022; Ferry & Midgley, 2022), and the study claims no more than the audit establishes.

Two design choices deserve statement. The study confines itself to two years rather than a longer series, because the mechanism operates within a single reporting period. And it exploits within-case variation across revenue instruments as a control, holding the organization, the fiscal year and the economy constant while the administrative task varies (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).

3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

When writing the "Results and Discussion" section for your article in the International Journal of Management Science and Information Technology (IJMSIT), it is essential to present your research findings clearly and interpret them in the context of your study objectives and existing literature. This section should be comprehensive yet concise, enabling readers to understand both the data and its implications. Start by presenting the key findings of your study, using appropriate visuals such as tables, graphs, and charts to illustrate your data. Ensure that these visuals are clearly labeled and referenced in the text. Provide a brief description of what each visual represents. Include basic descriptive statistics to summarize your data, such as means, medians, modes, standard deviations, and ranges for quantitative data. For qualitative data, provide summaries of key themes and patterns. If applicable, present the results of any inferential statistical analyses conducted, such as t-tests, ANOVA, regression analyses, or other statistical tests, and report the statistical significance (p-values), effect sizes, and confidence intervals. For qualitative research, provide detailed descriptions of the themes or categories identified in your data, using quotes or examples from your data to illustrate these themes, and explain how these themes relate to your research questions.

3.1. The Shock

Table 1 reports audited realization for 2025 against 2024. Tax revenue fell 19.51% and own-source revenue 15.17%, while intergovernmental transfers were flat (−0.87%). The contraction is located entirely in the reassigned instruments: the organization did not lose ground because support was withdrawn, but because its claim on its own base was reduced by statute.

Table 2. Audited Budget Realization, Central Java Province, 2024 and 2025 (IDR trillion)

Item	2025 Budget	2025 Actual	% Target	2024 Actual	Change (%)
Local taxes	12.459	11.438	91.81	14.210	−19.51
User charges	2.173	2.673	123.05	2.319	+15.29
Separated assets	0.690	0.547	79.21	0.688	−20.52
Other own-source revenue	0.377	0.315	83.41	0.434	−27.51
Own-source revenue	15.699	14.973	95.37	17.651	−15.17
Intergovernmental transfers	8.792	8.625	98.10	8.701	−0.87
Total revenue	24.655	23.762	96.38	26.379	−9.92

Note. Source: Laporan Keuangan Pemerintah Daerah Provinsi Jawa Tengah TA 2025 (audited), Laporan Realisasi Anggaran. Percentage changes calculated from unrounded values.

The direction of this change is not self evidently adverse. Iacuzzi, Padovani and Canestrini (2025), analysing municipalities across nine countries, find that greater fiscal autonomy improves long-term solvency while complicating short-term liquidity, so the relationship between autonomy and financial health is conditional rather than monotonic. What makes the present case consequential is not the own-source ratio itself but what the organization did in response to it.

3.2. The Response and the Reported Improvement

The province responded on two fronts. It granted transitional relief to taxpayers, reducing the principal vehicle tax by 13.94% and transfer duty by 24.70% until 31 March 2025, while declining to discount the district surcharge, and it operated an amnesty between April and June 2025 directed at the receivables stock.

The reported result was favourable. Gross receivables fell from IDR 3,009.56 billion to IDR 2,529.22 billion, a reduction of IDR 480.34 billion or 15.96%; tax receivables specifically fell 15.94%. For an organization that had just lost a fifth of its tax revenue, a double-digit reduction in its most visible administrative problem was a defensible thing to report.

3.3. The Decomposition: Derecognition, Not Collection

The operational statement discloses a bad-debt expense of IDR 624.83 billion for 2025, against IDR 141.64 billion in 2024 an increase of 341.15%. The balance sheet shows the allowance for doubtful receivables falling slightly, from IDR 560.16 billion to IDR 528.09 billion. These three figures are jointly informative, because an allowance can only fall while a large expense is being recognized if amounts have been removed from it. Table 3 sets out the reconciliation.

Table 3. Allowance Roll-Forward and Decomposition of the Reported Receivables Reduction, 2025 (IDR billion)

Component	Amount (IDR billion)	Source or Derivation
Opening allowance, 1 Jan 2025	560.16	Balance sheet, 2024
Bad-debt expense recognized in 2025	+624.83	Operational statement
Closing allowance, 31 Dec 2025	528.09	Balance sheet, 2025
Implied write-offs during 2025	656.91	Residual: 560.16 + 624.83 − 528.09
Opening gross receivables	3,009.56	Balance sheet, 2024
Closing gross receivables	2,529.22	Balance sheet, 2025
Reported reduction in gross receivables	480.34	Difference (−15.96%)
Excess of write-offs over reported reduction	176.57	656.91 − 480.34

Note. Gross receivables comprise tax receivables and user charge receivables. The reconciliation assumes allowance movements comprise only bad-debt expense and write-offs. Source: audited financial statements, FY2025; derivation by the author.

On these figures the reported story inverts. Write-offs of IDR 656.91 billion exceed the IDR 480.34 billion reduction in the stock by IDR 176.57 billion. Because the stock fell by less than the amount removed from it, the balance of movements new assessments falling into arrears, net of cash recovered against prior arrears must have been positive: excluding derecognition, the receivables position would have deteriorated by approximately IDR 176.57 billion during a year in which the organization reported a 15.96% improvement.

The conclusion's strength depends on the reconciliation's assumption. For the reported reduction to have been achieved without derecognition, write-offs would have had to fall below IDR 480.34 billion; if the allowance moved only through the disclosed expense and write offs, the implied write off is bounded below by IDR 592.76 billion, which already exceeds the reported reduction, so the direction of the finding is secure within that assumption. The assumption is not self-evidently satisfied: the 2025 statement of changes in equity discloses a cumulative effect of accounting policy changes and error corrections of IDR 1,244.21 billion, two and a half times the reported receivables reduction, and if a material portion passed through the allowance or gross receivables the roll forward is misspecified. The result is therefore conditional on the disclosed balances and the stated assumption. Two elements do not depend on it, however: the deterioration in the receivable's ratio (Section 3.4) is computed directly from reported balances and revenue, and the rise in bad-debt expense from IDR 141.64 billion to IDR 624.83 billion is a reported figure, not a derivation. Both point in the same direction, so the central claim that the reported improvement is not evidence of improving capability survives even if the write off estimate is set aside; what would be lost is the ability to say how the improvement was produced, not that it was not a recovery.

The interpretation is not that the amnesty was improper, nor that the organization intended to mislead means–ends decoupling characteristically operates without deceptive intent, because participants monitor the indicator that improves (Bromley & Powell, 2012). More narrowly, the activity produced an accounting outcome rather than an administrative one: nothing in the accounts indicates that the organization became better at converting assessment into cash, and the flows indicate it became slightly worse. This is the arithmetic signature the framework anticipates: the improvement is real in the stock, absent from the flows, and separable using three figures that every organization reporting under the applicable standards must disclose.

3.4. The Ratio Moved the Other Way

If the stock is a poor measure of collection capability, the natural alternative is the ratio of receivables to the revenue they arise from. That ratio deteriorated: tax receivables equalled 20.39% of annual tax revenue at the end of 2024 and 21.29% at the end of 2025, because the revenue base contracted faster (−19.51%) than the stock (−15.94%).

This produces the paradox in its sharpest form. An intervention that reduced the numerator by a sixth left the organization carrying proportionally more uncollected claim than before, because it did nothing about the denominator, and the denominator was itself collapsing for reasons the organization could not control. Managing a stock is only equivalent to managing performance when the base is stable; under a resource shock the two diverge, and they diverge in the direction that flatters the stock. Allowance coverage tells a consistent story, rising from 18.61% to 20.88% of gross receivables: the organization's own assessment of recoverability worsened even as its headline stock improved.

3.5. Within-Case Control: The Same Organization, a Different Instrument

A single-case design invites the objection that the shortfall reflects conditions rather than capability. The province's own accounts allow that objection to be tested, because the same organization administered a second revenue instrument in the same year under the same conditions: user charges reached 123.05% of target and grew 15.29%, while taxes reached 91.81% of target and fell 19.51%. Receivables behaved similarly across the two user charge receivables fell 16.39% against 15.94% for taxes so the difference in outcome cannot be attributed to the economy, the workforce, the budget cycle or the political environment, all of which were common.

One confounds must be conceded: attainment against target depends on how the target was set, which the accounts do not disclose. The year-on-year direction of movement, however, does not depend on targets and differs in sign between the instruments, and the 2025 tax target was set with knowledge that the surcharge would take effect, so it should have been the more conservative of the two.

The two tasks differ specifically. User charges are collected at the point of service delivery, where non-payment prevents the service and the organization holds the leverage. Vehicle tax runs through a shared registration process in which the province holds the fiscal claim while the police registry controls the enforcement trigger and the insurer holds a third interest, with no party owning the register. Where the organization controlled the whole chain it exceeded target by a quarter; where it controlled one link of three it fell short consistent with the 2025 legislative study, which identifies fragmented process ownership as a principal constraint, and with evidence that in shared-delivery arrangements performance is governed less by formal structure than by communication, trust and coordination among participating units (Natoil & Zulkifli, 2020; Carr Kelman, Brady, Raschke, & Schoon, 2023). A third instrument completes the comparison: dividend income from separated assets, which depends on directing entities the province does not operate, reached only 79.21% of target. The ordering across the three follows process control rather than economic conditions.

The shared-process reading also explains why the reform made the problem harder rather than easier. Before 2025 the receivables stock was the province's alone; under the surcharge, 66% of every uncollected liability is a district loss, so the outstanding claim became a shared exposure across 36 governments with no single process owner, and the relative attractiveness of the derecognition route rose accordingly.

3.6. What the Organization Could Not Do Instead

Three alternatives were foreclosed within the relevant horizon. The reassigned base could not be recovered: through November 2025, receipts accruing to the 35 recipient jurisdictions rose by an average of 38.57%, so growth in the base was captured by a different tier rather than lost to the public sector, and the province additionally absorbed transitional cost by reducing its own principal rates. Rate policy offered no room, since statutory rates for the remaining provincial instruments had been fixed a year before the shock (Peraturan Daerah Provinsi Jawa Tengah Nomor 12 Tahun 2023) and the province's own rates had just been reduced as part of the surcharge design. Base broadening was too slow: the two instruments intended to widen the portfolio surface water tax and heavy equipment tax together contributed less than 0.15% of tax revenue and require measurement infrastructure with lead times measured in years. What remained was the receivables stock: large, visible, attributable to the organization itself, and addressable within a single quarter.

3.7. Conditions for an Indicator-Directed Response

The case suggests three conditions, advanced as propositions for testing rather than findings, under which an organization facing an uncontestable resource shock will act on an indicator rather than on the capability beneath it.

The first is indicator visibility combined with attributability. The receivables stock was published, large, expressed in a single number and, unlike the revenue loss, plainly the organization's own responsibility; an organization that must demonstrate competence selects the indicator on which it can be blamed, since that is the one on which improvement counts as evidence (refining Pierre & de Fine Licht, 2021). The second is the availability of a derecognition instrument: means ends decoupling requires an action that moves the indicator without moving the underlying state, and amnesty is administratively cheap, legally sanctioned and rapid. Where no such instrument exists, an organization under the same pressure has no alternative to substantive work. The third is lead-time asymmetry: the substantive remedy here reconciling three agencies' registers, establishing an accountable owner for the receivable's portfolio, and building enforcement capability has a lead time measured in years, while the symbolic remedy delivers within a quarter, and under an annual reporting cycle the asymmetry is decisive.

These conditions also explain the self-reinforcing property that Bromley and Powell (2012) identify: because the amnesty improved the stock, the pressure that might have forced the slower remedy was relieved, and the province's announcement of a further penalty waiver window suggests the sequence is repeating consistent with the compliance literature's expectation that repeated amnesties are anticipated, so the instrument becomes a substitute for rather than a supplement to routine enforcement (Koch & Müller, 2024). The observable signature of the difference between a defensible one-off amnesty and a repeated substitute is whether the ratio improves in the periods between amnesties; here it deteriorated during the amnesty year itself.

3.8. Theoretical and Practical Implications

For decoupling theory, the case extends means ends decoupling from voluntary adoption to involuntary loss. The classic account concerns organizations importing practices to secure legitimacy; here the organization imports nothing and instead redirects effort toward the most defensible internal number. The trigger is not aspiration but exposure, and the resulting decoupling is between an accounting outcome and an administrative one rather than between a policy and its implementation. This suggests that means–ends decoupling should be expected wherever accountability is high, capability is slow to build, and an accounting instrument can move the measure.

For work on organizational capability, the case supplies an empirical separation that is usually unavailable. Capability is difficult to observe directly, and stock measures are commonly used as proxies. The roll-forward reconciliation shows that these proxies can move in the opposite direction to the capability they proxy, and that the two can be separated using disclosures that public organizations are already required to publish. The diagnostic generalizes: any organization reporting an improvement in a provisioned asset can be tested this way.

This has a further implication for how organizational learning is assessed. Learning is conventionally inferred from improvement and improvement from indicators; if the indicator can move without the routine changing, inferred learning may record nothing more than an accounting action. Evidence that learning capacity, technological investment and strategic quality operate as complements rather than substitutes (Zulkifli, Nurhayati, Widodo, & Junaidi, 2020) explains why the substantive route is slow: it requires all three to move together, whereas the symbolic route requires only an administrative decision.

For research on public organizations facing institutional shocks, the case argues against evaluating adjustment by outcome indicators alone. Assessed on its own targets, the province underperformed by 8.19% on tax and overperformed by 23.05% on user charges; assessed on its receivables stock, it improved by 15.96%. All three figures are correct and all three are misleading. The informative measures the ratio and the flow decomposition are available in the same documents but are not reported as performance indicators by anyone.

Three implications follow, stated as inferences from the case rather than recommendations, since a single case cannot establish what any organization ought to do. The first concerns which indicator is managed: a target expressed as receivables relative to revenue cannot be met by derecognition, whereas a stock target can. The second concerns the derecognition instrument, better regulated than prohibited: a rule limiting amnesty frequency and requiring published cost–benefit assessment would preserve its one-off value while removing the anticipation effect. The third concerns the shared-process constraint, where the within-case comparison locates the capability gap.

Two have direct experimental support. Okunogbe and Santoro (2023) show that third-party and technology-mediated information converts a nominal liability into a collectable one; register reconciliation is therefore a precondition for enforcement rather than a housekeeping task. Khan, Khwaja and Olken (2016) show that collector incentives raised revenue growth by 46% over two years without statutory change. Both act on the ratio rather than the stock. Gadenne (2017) adds that municipalities raising revenue through improved tax capacity subsequently spent it more accountably.

The third implication has a recognized difficulty attached to it. Lee (2022) shows that collaborative arrangements generate competing accountability demands that participants must actively manage, and that these tensions can become productive rather than merely obstructive when they are surfaced instead of suppressed. Applied to a shared tax base, this suggests that the province and the districts should expect disagreement about who is accountable for uncollected liability, and should design the forum to hold that disagreement rather than to avoid it.

For those who evaluate such organizations legislatures, audit institutions and central finance ministries the practical contribution is the diagnostic itself. A reported reduction in receivables should be read alongside the bad-debt expense and the allowance movement, and a reduction that is not matched by an improving ratio should be treated as an accounting event rather than an administrative achievement.

4. CONCLUSION

This study asked what determines whether an organization facing an uncontestable resource shock builds capability or acts on the indicator. The organization reported a 15.96% reduction in receivables in the year its tax revenue fell 19.51%. Reconciling the allowance shows the reduction was produced by write-offs of IDR 656.91 billion, exceeding it by IDR 176.57 billion, so receivables excluding derecognition grew. The ratio measuring collection capability deteriorated from 20.39% to 21.29% and allowance coverage rose. A within-case comparison locates the missing capability in a process shared with two other agencies.

Six limitations qualify the findings, in descending order of severity. The write off estimate is a residual derived from three disclosed balances rather than a reported figure; the allowance movement schedule was not obtainable, and the 2025 accounts disclose a cumulative equity adjustment of IDR 1,244.21 billion whose composition is unestablished, so the reconciliation remains conditional until that schedule is examined. Capability is proxied by the receivables ratio rather than measured. The conditions in Section 6.1 concern organizational choice, which financial statements cannot observe, and are therefore propositions rather than findings. The within case comparison is confounded by undisclosed target-setting practice and corroborates rather than establishes the instrument-specific interpretation. And the single-case design supports analytic rather than statistical generalization, though the diagnostic itself is portable. A sixth limitation concerns external validity across institutional settings: the mechanisms identified here were inferred in a single legal and fiscal environment, and provinces operating under different accounting standards, disclosure requirements, or amnesty designs may decouple through different channels, so the three conditions proposed in Section 6.1 should be treated as candidate rather than confirmed boundary conditions until tested elsewhere.

Five extensions follow. Obtaining the allowance movement schedule and the composition of the cumulative equity adjustment would convert the central estimate into a reported quantity, and is the highest-value next step. Interview evidence on managerial reasoning would test the three conditions in Section 6.1. Applying the roll-forward diagnostic across a panel of governments subject to the same reform would establish how widely the pattern holds. And a longitudinal study across the announced further amnesty window would test the self-reinforcement proposition. A fifth avenue would compare this setting to other opaque public sector fields, such as social assistance targeting or state-owned enterprise receivables, where causal relations between effort and outcome are similarly hard to observe, to establish whether the conditions proposed here generalize beyond tax administration or are specific to it.

The broader claim is narrow enough to be useful. Organizations under pressure improve what is measured. Where the measure is a stock and an instrument exists that removes items from it, improvement can be produced without capability, and the accounts that record the improvement also record its absence. Reading both is a matter of arithmetic, not access.

REFERENCES

Aboubichr, B., & Conway, N. (2023). The gaming of performance management systems in British universities. Human Relations, 76(4), 602–628. https://doi.org/10.1177/00187267211052827

Athanasopoulou, A., Marti, E., Risi, D., & Schlindwein, E. (2025). How companies restrain means ends decoupling: A comparative case study of CSR implementation. Journal of Management Studies, 62(1), 214–245. https://doi.org/10.1111/joms.13043

Badan Pendapatan Daerah Provinsi Jawa Tengah. (2026). Dashboard pendapatan [Revenue dashboard]. Retrieved August 11, 2026, from https://esamsat.jatengprov.go.id

Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Jawa Tengah. (2025). Pertumbuhan ekonomi Jawa Tengah 2024 dan triwulanan 2025 [Central Java economic growth, 2024 and quarterly 2025]. Retrieved August 11, 2026, from https://jateng.bps.go.id

Bassey, E., Mulligan, E., & Ojo, A. (2022). A conceptual framework for digital tax administration: A systematic review. Government Information Quarterly, 39(4), 101754. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2022.101754

Bellon, M., Dabla-Norris, E., Khalid, S., & Lima, F. (2022). Digitalization to improve tax compliance: Evidence from VAT e-invoicing in Peru. Journal of Public Economics, 210, 104661. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104661

Bergeron, A., Tourek, G., & Weigel, J. L. (2024). The state capacity ceiling on tax rates: Evidence from randomized tax abatements in the DRC. Econometrica, 92(4), 1163–1193. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA16462

Bertello, A., De Bernardi, P., Ferraris, A., & Bresciani, S. (2022). Shedding lights on organizational decoupling in publicly funded R&D consortia: An institutional perspective on open innovation. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 176, 121433. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2021.121433

Bowen, G. A. (2009). Document analysis as a qualitative research method. Qualitative Research Journal, 9(2), 27–40. https://doi.org/10.3316/QRJ0902027

Bromley, P., & Powell, W. W. (2012). From smoke and mirrors to walking the talk: Decoupling in the contemporary world. Academy of Management Annals, 6(1), 483–530. https://doi.org/10.5465/19416520.2012.684462

Cantarelli, P., Belle, N., & Hall, J. L. (2023). Information use in public administration and policy decision-making: A research synthesis. Public Administration Review, 83(6), 1667–1686. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13692

Carr Kelman, C., Brady, U., Raschke, A. B., & Schoon, M. L. (2023). A systematic review of key factors of effective collaborative governance of social-ecological systems. Society & Natural Resources, 36(11), 1452–1470. https://doi.org/10.1080/08941920.2023.2228234

Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Provinsi Jawa Tengah. (2025). Laporan akhir kajian optimalisasi penerapan opsen terhadap pendapatan asli daerah tahun 2025 [Final report of the study on optimizing surcharge implementation for own-source revenue]. https://jdih.dprd.jatengprov.go.id

Eckersley, P., Lakoma, K., Murphy, P., Caygill, T., & Pell, C. (2025). Accountability as a function of power relationships in public governance networks. Public Administration, 103(3), 906–922. https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.13032

Eisenhardt, K. M., & Graebner, M. E. (2007). Theory building from cases: Opportunities and challenges. Academy of Management Journal, 50(1), 25–32. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2007.24160888

Eisenhardt, K. M., & Martin, J. A. (2000). Dynamic capabilities: What are they? Strategic Management Journal, 21(10–11), 1105–1121. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781405164054.ch21

Elston, T., & Zhang, Y. (2025). Ready, willing, and able? Bureaucratic capacity, slack resources, and political control. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 35(4), 452–468. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muaf021

Espeland, W. N., & Sauder, M. (2007). Rankings and reactivity: How public measures recreate social worlds. American Journal of Sociology, 113(1), 1–40. https://doi.org/10.1086/517897

Ferry, L., & Midgley, H. (2022). Democracy, accountability and audit: The creation of the UK NAO as a defence of liberty. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 35(2), 413–438. https://doi.org/10.1108/AAAJ-10-2020-4985

Ferry, L., Radcliffe, V. S., & Steccolini, I. (2022). The future of public audit. Financial Accountability & Management, 38(3), 325–336. https://doi.org/10.1111/faam.12339

Gadenne, L. (2017). Tax me, but spend wisely? Sources of public finance and government accountability. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 9(1), 274–314. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20150509

Greenwood, R., Raynard, M., Kodeih, F., Micelotta, E. R., & Lounsbury, M. (2011). Institutional complexity and organizational responses. Academy of Management Annals, 5(1), 317–371. https://doi.org/10.5465/19416520.2011.590299

Han, Y., Hwang, K., Kim, E. A., & Robertson, P. J. (2026). The impact of accountability systems on public employee well-being and the moderating effects of role clarity and job autonomy. Public Management Review, 28(7), 1212–1238.

Iacuzzi, S., Padovani, E., & Canestrini, P. (2025). Does fiscal autonomy always fuel financial health in local governments? A cross-country analysis. Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management, 37(6), 370–392. https://doi.org/10.1108/JPBAFM-10-2024-0215

Jabbouri, R., Schneckenberg, D., & Truong, Y. (2022). From policy-practice to means-ends decoupling in organizations: A systematic review and paths for future research. Management International, 26(1), 46–63. https://doi.org/10.7202/1088440ar

Kaufmann, L., Krlev, G., & Brown, M. (2025). In plain sight: Mechanisms of means–ends decoupling in impact investing. Organization Studies. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1177/01708406241295505

Khan, A. Q., Khwaja, A. I., & Olken, B. A. (2016). Tax farming redux: Experimental evidence on performance pay for tax collectors. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131(1), 219–271. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv042

Koch, C., & Müller, C. (2024). Tax amnesties and the insurance effect: An experimental study. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 108, 102130. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2023.102130

Lee, S. (2022). When tensions become opportunities: Managing accountability demands in collaborative governance. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 32(4), 641–655. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muab051

Loureiro, R., Ferreira, J. J. M., & Simões, J. M. M. (2021). Dynamic capabilities i n public sector: Theoretical insights and research agenda. International Journal of Business Excellence, 25(2), 233–260. https://doi.org/10.1504/IJBEX.2021.119458

Meng, X., & Li, C. (2025). Does public sector performance information impact stakeholders? Evidence from a meta-analysis. Public Administration Review, 85(4), 1086–1097. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13924

Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83(2), 340–363. https://doi.org/10.1086/226550

Natoil, N., & Zulkifli, Z. (2020). Peningkatan Kinerja Berbasis Pada Kualitas Komunikasi, Kepercayaan Dan Kerjasama Tim. JURNAL CAPITAL: Kebijakan Ekonomi, Manajemen Dan Akuntansi, 2(1), 1-15. https://doi.org/10.33747/capital.v2i1.31

Okunogbe, O., & Santoro, F. (2023). The promise and limitations of information technology for tax mobilization. The World Bank Research Observer, 38(2), 295–324. https://doi.org/10.1093/wbro/lkac008

Oliver, C. (1991). Strategic responses to institutional processes. Academy of Management Review, 16(1), 145–179. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1991.4279002

Pemerintah Provinsi Jawa Tengah. (2026). Laporan keuangan pemerintah daerah Provinsi Jawa Tengah tahun anggaran 2025 (audited) [Audited local government financial statements of Central Java Province, FY2025]. https://data.jatengprov.go.id

Peraturan Daerah Provinsi Jawa Tengah Nomor 12 Tahun 2023 tentang Pajak Daerah dan Retribusi Daerah [Provincial Regulation No. 12 of 2023 on Regional Taxes and User Charges]. (2023).

Peraturan Daerah Provinsi Jawa Tengah Nomor 6 Tahun 2025 tentang Pertanggungjawaban Pelaksanaan Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah Tahun Anggaran 2024 [Provincial Regulation No. 6 of 2025 on Accountability for Budget Implementation, FY2024]. (2025).

Pierre, J., & de Fine Licht, J. (2021). Collaborative gaming: When principals and agents agree to game the system. Public Administration, 99(4), 711–722. https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12720

Siciliano, M. D., Zehra, M.-E., Gutiérrez-Meave, R., Deslatte, A., & Krause, R. M. (2026). Local governance and green ties: Assessing the relationship between functional and institutional collective action. State and Local Government Review. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1177/0160323X251410491

Siggelkow, N. (2007). Persuasion with case studies. Academy of Management Journal, 50(1), 20–24. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2007.24160882

Taylor, J., McDonnell, J., & Duong, H. (2022). Bureaucratic gaming: Causes and consequences for policy-making. International Journal of Public Policy, 16(5/6), 253–269. https://doi.org/10.1504/IJPP.2022.127430

Teece, D. J. (2007). Explicating dynamic capabilities: The nature and microfoundations of (sustainable) enterprise performance. Strategic Management Journal, 28(13), 1319–1350. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.640

Teece, D. J., Pisano, G., & Shuen, A. (1997). Dynamic capabilities and strategic management. Strategic Management Journal, 18(7), 509–533. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(199708)18:7%3C509::AID-SMJ882%3E3.0.CO;2-Z

Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 1 Tahun 2022 tentang Hubungan Keuangan antara Pemerintah Pusat dan Pemerintahan Daerah [Law No. 1 of 2022 on Financial Relations between the Central Government and Regional Governments]. (2022).

Vakulenko, V., Bourmistrov, A., & Grossi, G. (2020). Reverse decoupling: Ukrainian case of healthcare financing system reform. International Journal of Public Sector Management, 33(5), 519–534. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJPSM-10-2019-0262

Weingast, B. R. (2009). Second generation fiscal federalism: The implications of fiscal incentives. Journal of Urban Economics, 65(3), 279–293. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2008.12.005

Yin, R. K. (2018). Case study research and applications: Design and methods (6th ed.). SAGE.

Zhang, J., Li, H., & Yang, K. (2022). A meta-analysis of the government performance–trust link: Taking cultural and methodological factors into account. Public Administration Review, 82(1), 39–58. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13439

Zulkifli, Nurhayati, T., Widodo, & Junaidi, M. (2020). Improving organisational learning, strategic quality, organisational performance: Energising intellectual approach. International Journal of Learning and Intellectual Capital, 17(3), 297–308. https://doi.org/10.1504/IJLIC.2020.109920